• Advanced Photonics
  • Vol. 6, Issue 5, 056002 (2024)
Blake Wilson1,2,†, Yuheng Chen1,2, Daksh Kumar Singh1,2, Rohan Ojha1..., Jaxon Pottle3, Michael Bezick4, Alexandra Boltasseva1,2, Vladimir M. Shalaev1,2 and Alexander V. Kildishev1,*|Show fewer author(s)
Author Affiliations
  • 1Purdue University, Elmore Family School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, West Lafayette, Indiana, United States
  • 2Quantum Science Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, United States
  • 3Purdue University, School of Aeronautics and Astronautics, West Lafayette, Indiana, United States
  • 4Purdue University, Department of Computer Science, West Lafayette, Indiana, United States
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    DOI: 10.1117/1.AP.6.5.056002 Cite this Article Set citation alerts
    Blake Wilson, Yuheng Chen, Daksh Kumar Singh, Rohan Ojha, Jaxon Pottle, Michael Bezick, Alexandra Boltasseva, Vladimir M. Shalaev, Alexander V. Kildishev, "Authentication through residual attention-based processing of tampered optical responses," Adv. Photon. 6, 056002 (2024) Copy Citation Text show less

    Abstract

    The global chip industry is grappling with dual challenges: a profound shortage of new chips and a surge of counterfeit chips valued at $75 billion, introducing substantial risks of malfunction and unwanted surveillance. To counteract this, we propose an optical anti-counterfeiting detection method for semiconductor devices that is robust under adversarial tampering features, such as malicious package abrasions, compromised thermal treatment, and adversarial tearing. Our new deep-learning approach uses a RAPTOR (residual, attention-based processing of tampered optical response) discriminator, showing the capability of identifying adversarial tampering to an optical, physical unclonable function based on randomly patterned arrays of gold nanoparticles. Using semantic segmentation and labeled clustering, we efficiently extract the positions and radii of the gold nanoparticles in the random patterns from 1000 dark-field images in just 27 ms and verify the authenticity of each pattern using RAPTOR in 80 ms with 97.6% accuracy under difficult adversarial tampering conditions. We demonstrate that RAPTOR outperforms the state-of-the-art Hausdorff, Procrustes, and average Hausdorff distance metrics, achieving a 40.6%, 37.3%, and 6.4% total accuracy increase, respectively.
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    Blake Wilson, Yuheng Chen, Daksh Kumar Singh, Rohan Ojha, Jaxon Pottle, Michael Bezick, Alexandra Boltasseva, Vladimir M. Shalaev, Alexander V. Kildishev, "Authentication through residual attention-based processing of tampered optical responses," Adv. Photon. 6, 056002 (2024)
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