• Chinese Journal of Quantum Electronics
  • Vol. 36, Issue 3, 342 (2019)
MAYuanyuan 1、2、*, Gengtao JIA3, Yun LIU4, and Xiuli HUANG1、2
Author Affiliations
  • 1[in Chinese]
  • 2[in Chinese]
  • 3[in Chinese]
  • 4[in Chinese]
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    DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-5461.2019.03.014 Cite this Article
    MAYuanyuan, JIA Gengtao, LIU Yun, HUANG Xiuli. Security of quantum key distribution with wavelength attack[J]. Chinese Journal of Quantum Electronics, 2019, 36(3): 342 Copy Citation Text show less
    References

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    MAYuanyuan, JIA Gengtao, LIU Yun, HUANG Xiuli. Security of quantum key distribution with wavelength attack[J]. Chinese Journal of Quantum Electronics, 2019, 36(3): 342
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