In the context of fiscal decentralization and local competition, local government in China usually adopts means of supplying excessive industrial land and lowering the transfer price of industrial land, in order to attract more investment from enterprises. These measures could directly lead to lots of problems, such as inefficient use of industrial land and even serious waste. Regulating the scale of industrial land supply and giving play to the market's guiding role in the transfer price of industrial land are important ways to promote the intensive and efficient use of industrial land. This paper takes the transfer price of industrial land as the research object, and uses the national industrial land transfer data in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. Considering that the sample contains both macro and micro level information, this paper uses a hierarchical regression model to empirically analyze the spatial pattern of the transfer price of industrial land and its key affecting factors. The empirical research finds that: (1) Industrial land price in different regions of China have large differences and the government's ability to intervene can significantly affect the transfer price of urban industrial land. By controlling other factors, the stronger the local government's intervention ability, the lower the transfer price of industrial land in the region; (2) At the parcel level, the closer the industrial land is to the city center, the more developed the transport on this plot, or the closer the industrial land is to the water source, the higher the transfer price of the industrial land tends to be; (3) At the city level, the larger population of the city where the industrial land is located often means a higher level of economic development. Thus, the transfer price of the industrial land tends to be higher. This study introduces a layered model into the econometric model for the first time, and uses the premium rate of industrial land transfer (that is, the comparison of the price of industrial land transfer with the "lowest price standard") to characterize the behavior of local government industrial land transfer. At the same time, this article verifies the macro and micro factors that affect the price of industrial land transfer at the national level rather than at the city or province level. Therefore, this study supplements and extends the existing literature from multiple aspects.