• High Power Laser and Particle Beams
  • Vol. 31, Issue 7, 70001 (2019)
Xie Yanzhao*, Liu Minzhou, and Chen Yuhao
Author Affiliations
  • [in Chinese]
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    DOI: 10.11884/hplpb201931.190202 Cite this Article
    Xie Yanzhao, Liu Minzhou, Chen Yuhao. Electromagnetic resilience of critical national infrastructure[J]. High Power Laser and Particle Beams, 2019, 31(7): 70001 Copy Citation Text show less
    References

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    Xie Yanzhao, Liu Minzhou, Chen Yuhao. Electromagnetic resilience of critical national infrastructure[J]. High Power Laser and Particle Beams, 2019, 31(7): 70001
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